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A Selected Review of the Empirical Evidence ∗
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Abstract
The paper offers a review of selected topics in the empirical literature on struc-
tural change and sustainability. We focus on aspects of structural change that
directly affect emissions and energy intensity: changes of the sectoral composition
of economies, trade and international fragmentation of production, technological
change and innovation, and demand. We identify several empirical facts. First,
only a few countries have experienced a decoupling between growth and emissions,
due to proportionately faster growth rather than greater energy efficiency. Second,
the long-term shift from manufacturing to services has not led, in all cases, to the
de-materialisation of economies and a lower environmental burden. Exploitation of
energy efficiency increases depends on the ability of the service sectors to incorporate
technical changes to reduce energy intensity. Third, global trade and energy and
emissions intensity trends support the pollution haven hypothesis, which predicts
displacement of the environmental burden from developed to emerging countries.
The pursuit by developing countries of a long-term strategy of trading jobs for emis-
sions is likely to exacerbate the asymmetry related to emissions intensities between
developed and less developed economies. The review should inform debate on envi-
ronmental policy within the broader context of innovation and development policies.
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1 Introduction
The processes of economic growth and structural change are intertwined, with structural
change occurring at different levels and in different domains, such as production tech-
niques, intermediate and primary inputs, consumption, investment and technological
progress. All of these aspects affect the environment in terms of energy and emissions
intensity and, more largely, climate change. Ayres and van den Bergh (2005, p. 116)
contend that “Economic growth must be accompanied by structural change, which im-
plies continuous introduction of new products and new production technologies, and
changes in [energy] efficiency and de-materialisation”. It has been argued that we need
a theory to link different aspects of economic changes in a comprehensive framework
van den Bergh and Gowdy (2000).
Our previous contributions (Ciarli et al., 2010, 2018a; Ciarli and Savona, 2018) pro-
vide a theoretical grounding for and derive some empirical regularities related to various
aspects of structural change and their effect on growth. In this work we draw on the
seminal three-sector split model (Fisher, 1939), Lewis’s dual sector model (Lewis, 1954;
Gollin, 2014) and theories of (unbalanced) economic development (Chenery et al., 1986;
Hirschman, 1958; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). The aim of this research was to account for
numerous aspects that accompany traditional sectoral shifts within national economies,
which are related to long-term structural change and growth processes and to both the
supply and demand side. Among the supply side aspects considered, structural changes
include transformations in the division of labour and trade relations among countries,
both of which affect their terms of trade (Prebish, 1950; Singer, 1950); and changes of the
organisation of firms and production structures resulting from the diffusion of technical
change (Lazonick, 1979; von Tunzelmann, 1995; Mokyr, 2007). Among the demand side
aspects examined, structural change implies changes of preferences and the composition
of demand for new or cheaper products (Berg, 2002) that affects the societal structure
(McCloskey, 2009).
In the present paper and other work (Ciarli and Savona, 2018) included in this Special
Issue, we reprise the various aspects of structural change at the macro and meso-levels,
that we have shown to be relevant as a result of our previous research. These are the
changes of the sectoral composition of economies, which is gaining renewed interest in
view of the trends in developing countries (Rodrik, 2016); trade and international frag-
mentation of production, which affects the new distribution of the environmental burden
between developed and developing countries; technological change and innovation, which
might open up opportunities to increase energy efficiency; and demand. While much of
the literature focuses on subsets of aspects of structural change, as (Barba Navaretti
et al., 2014) demonstrate, the aim in this paper is to reveal the linkages among these
subsets of aspects and the related evidence from different literatures, including labour
economics, trade, environmental economics, the economics of innovation and political
ecology. Some of these aspects are quite well established although not free from contro-
versy (i.e., the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)1 , others have been relatively less
1All the acronyms/abbreviations used in this text are listed in Appendix Table ‘List of Acronyms’.
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explored (i.e., the effect of shifts to services on energy and emissions intensity trends).
The empirical literature uses several variables to investigate the environmental im-
pact of the above mentioned production and consumption changes. The most common
include energy intensity, which is the ratio of energy inputs to GDP, and is inversely
related to energy efficiency, and quality of the energy mix, which is inversely related to
the share of fossil fuel sources in the energy inputs mix. A frequently used indicator of
environmental sustainability is level and growth of Greenhouse Gas GHG emissions re-
sulting from anthropogenic activities (referred to as emissions henceforth). In this paper,
unless otherwise specified, we refer mainly to energy intensity and emissions intensity
trends.2
The present review examines those aspects of structural change that have a direct im-
pact on the patterns of environmental sustainability and implications for climate change
more broadly:
1. sectors: changes to the sectoral composition of the economy related, mostly, to
shifts from manufacturing to services (tertiarisation);
2. international division of labour : trade and Global Value Chains (GVCs);
3. technical change, which, in our context, includes changes to the energy mix, in-
creased energy efficiency due to technical progress, introduction of new (cleaner)
product and services (eco-innovation);
4. demand, changes to income levels (GDP per capita) which affect consumption
patterns and preferences.
Our proposed systematisation of the literature is as comprehensive as possible with
respect to the dimensions of structural change mentioned above. The interrelated areas
we focus on include:
1. the relation between countries economic growth and environmental performance
(in terms of emissions or energy intensity). The EKC being the most common
hypothesis on this relation, we look at how this has been quantified and tested, in
both seminal as well as the most recent studies;
2. the relation between changes in the sectoral composition of economies, GHG emis-
sions, and the energy intensity of production, with a particular emphasis on the
tertiarization process;
3. the effect of changing trade patterns on the global map of emissions and changes
to energy intensity, with a particular emphasis on the Pollution Haven Hypothesis
(PHH ), and the implications for environmental equity linked to global trade.
2While we acknowledge that there is a wealth of indicators of environmental sustainability, such as
water pollution, waste, exposure to natural disaster, etc., the endeavor of covering them all here, albeit
interesting in the context of structural change, would exponentially inflate the scope of the paper.
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The main contribution of this empirical review is twofold: first, it identifies a few
empirical regularities, which, as argued in a related work (Ciarli and Savona, 2016), serve
as an empirical foundation for the modelling effort to understand climate policy com-
plexity, the subject of this Special Issue; second, it identifies areas, among those above,
that will require further research and data collection efforts and proposes directions for
a research agenda on the topic.
First, by appraising the arguments over the relation between economic growth and
environmental sustainability, we find evidence in support of an overall decoupling be-
tween economic growth (higher GDP) and energy intensity, which started in the mid
1970s. However, this global average hides substantial cross-country heterogeneity: only
a few countries have experienced a real decoupling between growth and energy inten-
sity. The global trend towards decreased energy intensity is attributable to a number of
countries growing proportionally faster rather than to a real (global) decrease in energy
inputs in GDP.
Second, review of the evidence on the effects of technical and sectoral change on emis-
sions intensity shows that long-term processes of tertiarisation of advanced economies
have been accompanied by different degrees of de-materialisation and reduction of emis-
sion alongside a decrease of the energy intensity of production. It has been argued
that this heterogeneity is due to the relatively poor performance of services in terms of
energy efficiency improvements (Marin and Zoboli, 2016). Potential means to reduce
energy intensity have been unexploited; also, they depend on whether technical change
in services allows improvements in energy efficiency and/or reduced emissions inten-
sity. Sectoral change is shaped by demand (Windrum et al., 2009; Ciarli et al., 2018b),
therefore, ultimately, the environmental impact of sectoral shifts depends on consumer
preferences.
Third, findings related to global trade and energy and emissions intensity tend to
confirm the PHH, which predicts a displacement of the environmental burden from de-
veloped to emerging and developing countries, and challenges or, certainly, qualifies -
the existence of an EKC at the global level. The displacement of the environmental bur-
den linked to north-south trade and the large differences in environmental regulations
dispute claims related to a global level EKC effect. However, we examine the arguments
related to the international distribution of income and (global) emissions intensity, which
tend to downplay the importance of an actual environmental displacement from north
to south. This tends to occur in contexts where policies encourage developing coun-
tries to achieve sustainable development by betting on their absolute and comparative
advantages in natural resources and related activities. The long-run consequences of a
systematic ‘game of trading jobs for emissions’ in the south are likely to lead to persis-
tent asymmetries and a wider gap between north and south. We argue that this gap
could arise for the south as the result of a ‘specialisation trap’, that is, the failure of
developing countries that produce dirty products, to upgrade to lower energy intensive
production processes. This phenomenon has been described as an ‘environmental Pre-
bisch deterioration’ of the terms of trade and resonates with the original Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis (Prebish, 1950; Pe´rez-Rinco´n, 2006), which predicts that the terms of trade
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in primary-product-based economies deteriorate vis a vis those of economies specialised
in manufactured products. In this context, we pay special attention to the LACs , which
are heterogenous and specialised in natural resources based industries. Historically, the
policies related to these industries have been aimed at changing the sectoral specialisa-
tion towards industry.
In suggesting directions for a research agenda on the topic, we argue that a first
fruitful line of research should aim at examining whether and to what extent sectoral
structural changes in services imply some degree of de-materialisation and reduced energy
and emissions intensity. Simulations on the extent of achievable reductions in energy,
emissions and material intensity in the presence of (eco) innovation in services could
help grounding evidence on this topic, building on what proposed in (Desmarchelier et
al., 2013; Desmarchelier and Gallouj, 2012).
A second research endeavour for scholars interested in the relation between structural
changes and environmental sustainability should entail bridging the different disciplines
(environmental economists, political ecologists and environmental ecologists) dealing
with the prospects of ‘trading jobs for emissions’ that developing countries currently
face, in a context of increasing international fragmentation of production that ideally
could facilitate environmental dumping and of premature de-industrialisation in emerg-
ing economies (Rodrik, 2016; Di Meglio et al., 2018).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first examine selected evi-
dence on the macro relations between economic growth and environmental sustainabil-
ity (Section 2). Second, we review contributions on the sectoral and technical changes
in relation to emissions and/or energy intensity trends (Section 3), first by examining
the decomposition methods, then the empirical evidence, and focusing particularly on
tertiarisation and de-materialisation (Section 3.3). We then examine the literature on
international trade, particularly the evidence that seeks empirical support to the pollu-
tion haven hypothesis (PHH ) (Section 4), a topic that deserves review of the arguments
on the international distribution of income proposed by environmental economists and
political ecologists (Section 5). The conclusions provide a summary of our findings, and
discussion of the implications for a research agenda on structural change and sustain-
ability (Section 6).
2 The Origins: Economic development and the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve
In a recent, comprehensive historical review of the economics of climate change (Stern
et al., 2013), Stern argues that the first estimations of anthropogenic emissions affecting
climate change 3 were downward biased because they were based on underestimates of
fossil fuel resources. The later empirical work on the link between economic growth
3The origins of the estimations of trends in Carbon Dioxide CO2 emissions in relation to economic
growth date back to the 1950s and build on John Tyndalls (1859) seminal work. Tyndall was the first
to identify heat transmission via gases, i.e. the greenhouse effect (Hulme, 2009) (see also Stern (2007,
2008) for a review).
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and climate change (proxied by the increase in energy intensity and the production of
emissions, has grown, although the evidence remains somewhat controversial. Compre-
hensive assessments of the impact of growth on climate change are affected by the high
level of uncertainty related to the non-economic impact of climate change and the prob-
ability of catastrophic damage (see (Weitzman, 2011)). There is also a large literature
on the economic impact of measures aimed at mitigating the effects of climate change,
although these, also, are quite controversial. Some of the uncertainty is due to areas that
are ignored in relevant analyses: for instance, (Stern et al., 2013) argue that “studies of
consumer preferences for adaptation priorities and willingness to pay as an indication of
the benefits to be achieved are virtually absent”.4
There are two main areas of interest in this literature stream: (i) the causal relation-
ship between GDP growth and energy intensity or emissions trends and their convergence
across countries; and (ii) the decomposition and attribution of sources of emissions to so-
called KAYA factors (after (Kaya and Yokobori, eds, 1997)), such as population growth,
per capita income and consumption, carbon intensity of energy, energy intensity (see the
KAYA decomposition in, among many others, (Raupach et al., 2007)). Here, we focus
on the first, theEKC, which has triggered a large literature that is reviewed below.
The EKC is an inverted U-shaped relation between GDP levels and energy intensity
and polluting emissions trends, at the country level. One of the first hints of the existence
of an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic growth and intensity of energy
use and emissions is in Nordhaus (1977). Since then, attempts to quantify the regularities
of and exceptions to this relationship have flourished. There are a few extensive reviews
covering different time-spans and countries (Dinda, 2004; Millimet et al., 2003; Stern,
2004; Stern and Enflo, 2013). Nevertheless, despite this large literature, countries show
heterogeneous evidence on the presence of a EKC.
One of the most comprehensive empirical analyses in terms of time (1971-2010) and
country (99 countries) coverage, is provided by Csereklyei et al. (2014). The main find-
ings from this study are as follows.
Growth and energy intensity trends. A heterogeneous process of decoupling.
Firstly, since the mid 1970s, there has been a decoupling between growth and energy
intensity at the global level, with energy intensity declining over time, although with
an elasticity lower than unity with respect to GDP growth. However, this phenomenon
hides a large heterogeneity across countries: decoupling between growth and energy
intensity has occurred in only a few developed countries (Csereklyei et al., 2014). As
income grows, so it does the ratio of energy input to GDP, so that a decoupling occurs
only if the rate of growth of energy intensity is slower than the rate of income growth.
The global trend towards a decrease in energy intensity is due, mainly, to a number of
countries growing proportionally faster rather than to a decrease in the level of energy
inputs to GDP.
4We reprise the issue of demand in Section 3.3 and refer to the few contributions on the role of
consumer preferences and demand.
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It is interesting that the energy/capital ratio is over time declining proportionally
more than energy intensity. Also, those countries that have experienced an increase in
their energy intensity have experienced an increase in their energy/capital ratios too.
This seems to be in line with the findings for four LAC s (Brazil, Chile, Colombia and
Mexico) in Altomonte and Correa (2011), who attribute the increase in the energy use
coupled with weak productivity growth to the specialisation of these countries in natu-
ral resources (see also Barba Navaretti et al. (2014)). Overall, a decoupling effect could
hide increases in energy intensity and consumption in absolute terms, so the evidence of
alleged achievement of decoupling targets might be misleading.
A recent renewed interest in the trade-off between growth and emissions intensity has
sparked new analyses of the impact of population growth. For instance, Casey and
Galor (2017) estimate the elasticity of emissions to population and income per capita
over the past 60 years and find that it is seven time larger than the elasticity of emis-
sions to income per capita. They conclude that slowing population growth by means of
fertility policies could still allow income per capita growth with no increases in emissions.
Convergence of energy intensity and energy/capital ratios.
Secondly, there has been unconditional convergence in terms of energy intensity and
the energy/capital ratio since the mid 1970s. Countries with a low initial energy inten-
sity level – with respect to their GDP per capita – tend to experience higher increases
in both energy intensity and the energy/capital ratio (Csereklyei et al., 2014) 5 It has
been argued, also in Stern et al. (2013), that the convergence in energy intensity levels
in past decades is unprecedented. In the 20th century, there was much greater variation
in energy intensity over time at each given level of income.
Cost share of energy.
Thirdly, although tested for only a small number of countries (Sweden, US and UK ),
Csereklyei et al. (2014) find that the cost share of energy in GDP has decreased over
time. This suggests that the ratio of energy per worker has increased over time (with
income), driving the cost share of energy down.
Finally, the ‘energy ladder hypothesis’ seems to be confirmed by the data: the energy
quality mix improves with income growth (Semieniuk, 2018).
The empirical findings mentioned above are confirmed only to some degree in par-
ticular macro-areas of emerging countries, for instance in LAC s (see Russi et al., 2008;
Poudel et al., 2009; Rubio and Folchi, 2012). Poudel et al. (2009) estimate paramet-
ric and semi-parametric specifications to test the presence of an EKC over the period
1980-2000 in the LAC s, based on CO2 emissions and controlling for forestry area among
the usual variables. They find remarkable differences across countries when they con-
5Csereklyei et al. (2014) show that all unconditional and conditional convergence tests in their em-
pirical analysis are highly significant, meaning that energy intensity and the energy/capital ratio are
increasing in low energy intensive countries.
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trol for extension of forestry land: while, with the exception of Brazil, countries with
high proportions of forestry land (usually the lowest income countries - Paraguay, Peru,
Venezuela, Bolivia and Brazil) are located in the growing segment of the curve, those
with a medium presence of forestry (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Honduras and
Nicaragua) tend to show a N-shaped EKC curve rather than the traditional U-shape.
There seems to be a turning point at the level of about USD 4,800 per capita, beyond
which CO2 emissions intensity starts to rise again. This result is robust to the exclusion
from the analysis of Brazil, Colombia and Peru and is found to drive the trend for the
whole region. Therefore, it seems that, based on CO2 emissions, the EKC for Latin
America is less of a stylised fact than the narrative around the traditional EKC might
imply.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the EKC cannot be considered a ‘stylised fact’
or empirical regularity for all countries. In fact, much of the evidence reviewed in the
rest of this paper deals with empirical issues that qualify the evidence on the EKC. For
instance, the cross-country heterogeneity in the occurrence of a growth/energy inten-
sity decoupling is linked strongly to sectoral specialisation, which, in turn, explains the
different trends in the energy/capital ratios. The higher risk for those countries that
have not yet reached the peak point of the EKC or demonstrate an N-shaped EKC,
is of being caught in a ‘specialisation trap’, which increases their energy intensity and
energy/capital ratio without any productivity gains (Altomonte and Correa, 2011). This
chimes with a recent concern expressed by Rodrik (2016) in relation to the ‘premature
de-industrialisation’ in developing countries, while Magnani (2000), for instance, exam-
ines the political economy of the EKC by considering the within and between country
income distributions. We review the evidence on the sectoral and technical change ex-
plaining (at least part of) energy intensity trends in the next section (??.
3 Sources of structural changes and energy intensity and
emissions trends.
The (implicit) analytical bases of the EKC rely, first and foremost, on the structural
economic changes occurring at different levels of GDP. Economic growth is traditionally
associated first to industrialisation and then the progressive tertiarisation (which does
not necessarily imply de-industrialisation) of economies. This latter might (or might not,
as discussed in Section 3.3) entail some degree of de-materialisation, intended, broadly, as
a reduction in energy and natural resources inputs to production ?. However, technical
progress could enable reductions in the energy intensity of production processes, by
reducing the energy inputs and improving the energy mix. The empirical literature not
only tests for the presence of an EKC across countries and time spans and with or
without the presence of trade but also decomposes the sources of GDP and emissions
trends in terms of changes to the sectoral composition of economies and technological
change.
This section reviews selected studies to examine the extent to which the increase
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(decrease) in the energy intensity of production in a given country over a certain time-
span can be accounted for by shifts towards sectors with higher(lower)-than-average
levels of energy intensity or by within-sector increases (decreases) in energy intensity.
In other words, we are interested in the extent to which changes in energy intensity
and emissions trends are due to a composition (between-sectors) effect or a technical
change (within-sectors) effect. In turn, the technical change effect depends crucially
on the extent to which firms have incentives to innovate and use cleaner production
processes, and/or introduce new, less energy-intensive products and services, as a result,
for instance, of the need to comply with (new) environmental regulations. First, we
review the different decomposition methods (3.1) and then discuss the main empirical
evidence (3.2). We then review the (comparatively small) literature on tertiarization and
de-materialisation (3.3). Finally, we evaluate the seminal and most recent contributions
on the effectiveness of environmental regulation on firms eco-innovation (the Porter
hypothesis) (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
3.1 Decomposition methods: A brief inventory
The two most common sets of tools to decompose the sources of energy efficiency between
sectoral and technical change are Index Decomposition Analysis (IDA) and Structural
Decomposition Analysis (SDA).6
Extending the work of Hoekstra and van den Bergh (2003),7 Ang et al. (2009, 2010)
and Su and Ang (2012) provide comprehensive reviews of the different types and purposes
of decomposition techniques. While IDA is employed mostly to assess energy use and the
drivers of emissions in a specific sector and is used almost exclusively by energy scholars,
SDA provides a cross-sectoral and, often cross-country (see Section 3.2) decomposition
of energy intensity, in an Input Output (I/O) framework. Due to its relevance to this
study, we focus on the use of and refinements to SDA techniques, as in (Su and Ang,
2012). (Mulder et al., 2014) and (Voigt et al., 2014) also provide useful discussions on
the criteria for choosing an appropriate decomposition technique.
Basically, SDA techniques allow distinguishing between a structural (cross-sectoral)
factor, that is, the aggregate changes in countries energy intensity due to changes in
their sectoral composition, holding constant the within-sector energy intensity, and a
technical (within-sector) factor, that is, changes in the energy intensity of each sector,
holding constant the structure of the economy.
The first use of SDA was based on simple, national I/O tables, use of arbitrary base
years in Laspeyres and Paasche price indices and in general included a residual from the
decompostion, which, depending on its dimension, could complicate the interpretation
of results, according to Su and Ang (2012). The nature of the successive refinements to
these decomposition techniques led to the achievement of important properties such as
independence from the unit of analysis and exact decomposition (i.e., with no residual).
Currently, the most commonly used SDA is the Log-Mean Divisia Index (LMDI ).
6The latter is used, also, to decompose sources of productivity and employment growth.
7See also Hoekstra and van den Bergh (2006).
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Typically, the energy (energy consumption and emissions) decomposition studies re-
viewed, use additive rather than multiplicative LMDI decomposition techniques. A few
decomposition works use the Mean Rate of Change Index (MRCI ) and parametric Di-
visia methods. According to Su and Ang (2012), the most recent studies based on these
techniques tend to focus on China and Japan, and on emissions rather than energy
consumption. Some of the most recent studies reprise the DEL method proposed by Di-
etzenbacher and Los (1998), which assumes no preference for a particular form (additive
or non-parametric) and address the non-arbitrariness issue with respect to the sequence
of (decomposition) factors chosen 8.
In the next section, we highlight the empirical evidence based on the use of SDA
techniques, mainly LMDI ones.
3.2 Decomposition evidence: sectoral structure and technical change
One of the most recent and exhaustive additions to the empirical literature that makes
use of a LMDI decomposition technique, is in (Voigt et al., 2014), who decompose
energy savings trends (changes in energy inputs per changes in gross output) between
technological change and structural change using World Input Output Data (WIOD),
matched to Socio Economic Accounts (SEA), which provide data on employment, wages
and skills and gross energy use, for 40 countries over the period 1995-2007. The novelty
of this work is that it also takes account of within-country regional heterogeneity. To
our knowledge, this is the most exhaustive decomposition exercise to date.
The authors apply a three-factor (LMDI -II) decomposition which looks at: (i)
within-sector technical change leading to higher energy efficiency; (ii) the sectoral change
effect - split into: (iia) a within-country effect, that is, the shift towards more/less en-
ergy intensive sectors at the domestic level, and (iib) a between-country effect which
attributes changes in overall energy emissions trends to shifts towards more/less energy
intensive countries; and (iii) a global technology effect which looks at global gains in
energy efficiency, at the aggregate level, for 34 sectors.
Based on overall trends for different energy sources, Voigt et al. (2014) find that
coke petroleum and nuclear fuel are the least heterogeneous sectors across countries, in
terms of energy intensity improvements. For global sectoral shifts in energy savings, the
most energy efficient sectors across countries are machinery, and electrical and optical
equipment. The evidence shows that in most of the countries included in the study,
there is a decoupling between gross output growth and energy use (i.e., energy use
grew at a lower rate than gross output - in the UK it even declined), with the eastern
European countries among the best performers, most likely due to shifts away from
energy intensive industries. Overall, sectoral heterogeneity in terms of changes to energy
saving (i) emerges as being more pronounced than country heterogeneity (iia).
In relation to convergence patterns, (Voigt et al., 2014) find a strong relationship
between initial levels of energy intensity and intensity of energy reduction (Figure 1),
8The choice of sequence of factors is not neutral for the results obtained. In general, the LMDI, based
on index number theory, is preferred for its relative computational (non)complexity and ease of inter-
pretation of results, as they treat zero and negative values in matrices and allow exact decompositions.
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so that - not surprisingly - the majority of countries with low initial levels of energy in-
tensity have low energy intensity reductions (most developed countries, and Brazil and
Indonesia). Similarly, countries with high initial levels of energy intensity experienced
high reductions in energy intensity over the period considered (eastern European coun-
tries and China). Despite the structural shift to services, India shows high initial levels
of energy intensity and particularly poor performance in terms of reductions in energy
intensity rates.
There seems to be an overall trend towards country convergence in energy intensity,
which supports the aggregate findings in Section 2. In the structural decomposition
analysis, although less pronounced than the cross-sectoral heterogeneity, the specific
role of the between-country effect seems to be important: the global energy intensity
trend is affected strongly by a global shift in production towards more energy intensive
countries. Despite this global shift, world energy intensity shows a decreasing trend,
likely driven by an overall positive technology (within-sector) effect.
To summarise, in a ranking of the role of the different sources of energy intensity
changes at the global level, the within-sector source (technology) plays the most impor-
tant role and affects sectoral heterogeneity in energy intensity comparatively more than
structural sectoral and country shifts. Among these latter, it seems that the between-
country effect is more important than the within-country effect, so that the rise of China,
for instance, in the global share of production has affected global energy emissions trends
more than national structural changes.
Figures 2 include the group of countries that have performed worst in terms of
reducing their energy intensity, that is, they started from low levels of energy intensity
and have achieved very low rates of energy intensity reductions. This group includes
Brazil, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan and Denmark. For instance, Brazil performed
relatively badly in terms of a technology effect, despite the structural shift after year
2000 towards less energy-intensive sectors. However, this has not driven down energy
intensity or offset poor technological performance.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
The best performing countries are the UK, Ireland, Sweden, South Korea, Slovenia,
Turkey and Cyprus. None presents marked differences in the roles of technology and
structural change, both of which have played positive roles in lowering aggregate energy
intensity.
While the empirical exercise in Voigt et al. (2014) seems the most exhaustive in its
genre, most of the literature that uses SDA focuses on a small number of countries or
emissions types, and many examine China vis a vis the US. For instance, (Mulder and
de Groot, 2012) and (Mulder et al., 2014) investigate 18 OECD countries from 1970 to
2005; (Kaivo-oja et al., 2014) studies China (see also (Su and Ang, 2012) and (Tian et al.,
2014)) the US and the EU27 ; (Poudel et al., 2009), (Russi et al., 2008) and (Jimenez and
Mercado, 2014) present evidence on LAC s; while (Panayotou et al., 2000) on a number of
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developing countries. Although the body of evidence based on SDA conducted on a large
number of countries is smaller that evidence on single macro-regions, we can examine
the case of the LAC s, which is particularly interesting due to their main specialisation
in natural resources.
(Jimenez and Mercado, 2014) provide an interesting methodological extension to
SDA: after decomposing the trends in energy intensity according to structural and tech-
nological change, they conduct a regression analysis to explore the determinants of the
decomposition results. They employ a synthetic control method to construct a group of
comparison countries and propose some implications of the relative energy performance
in the region. This latter (Synth) method uses the characteristics of the average LAC to
construct a ‘convex combination of non-Latin American Countries with similar charac-
teristics’ (Jimenez and Mercado, 2014, p. 164), which represents a set of ‘counterfactual’
countries. Figs 3 and 4 compare the energy intensity decomposition for LAC s and high
and middle income countries, distinguishing among intensity (consumption), efficiency
(technical change) and types of activity (sectoral change).
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
They find that, overall, energy intensity has decreased over the past 40 years in all
the 75 countries included in the study, with marked differences across countries: 54% in
high income countries, about 40% in low income countries, while LAC s, which, typically,
have low initial levels of energy intensity, have slightly under-performed, with only a 20%
decrease. According to the decomposition in (Jimenez and Mercado, 2014), the relative
contribution of the three factors to the trend of energy intensity varies strongly.
First, in general, technical change is responsible for most of the improvement in
energy efficiency.
Second, while in high income countries (typically the OECD group) sectoral change
has contributed 10% of the decrease in energy intensity, in the LAC s, it accounts for
8% of the increase in energy use (Jimenez and Mercado, 2014, p.165), most likely due
to specialisation in extractive natural resources industries9. However, this trend is also
highly heterogeneous across LAC s. This finding is in line with, for instance, Mulder and
de Groot (2012), as shown in Fig 4.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
These results suggest that there is substantial room for improvement in the LAC s,
based on the technology effect and, also, the structural component of the energy effi-
ciency improvement. In this respect, from the perspective of industrial and political
ecologists, it might be useful to increase awareness about the possible implications of
macro-economic policies on sectoral change.
Russi et al. (2008) conduct a Material Flow Analysis (MFA) over the same period of
40 years for a small group of LACs, that is, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, to test
9we refer the reader to interesting evidence on the role of natural resource abundance and the natural
resource curse are provided in (Barba Navaretti et al., 2014).
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the impact of neo-liberal reforms on what industrial ecologists describe as the ‘extractive
countries’.
MFA is different from SDA and is used to assess the impact of structural change pro-
moted by trade, on the Physical Trade Balance (PTB) 10 This is the difference between
exports and imports in terms of the material-equivalents of flows of goods. (Russi et
al., 2008) start from Domestic Material Extraction (DME ), that is, the amount of raw
materials extracted within the countrys borders. They add imports to obtain Direct
Material Input (DMI ), which is material inputs to the national economy, either internal
or imported, which feed into further production processes. After subtracting exports
from DMI, Domestic Material Consumption (DMC ), which is the total amount of ma-
terial remaining in the country is obtained. Thus, the countrys trade specialisation is of
crucial importance to determine the overall PTB.
The use of MFA in conjunction with SDA techniques is important to assess the
relationship between economic growth, and the structural and trade specialisation in
countries, such as LAC s, where Natural Resources (NR) play a large role in the national
economy. It is well known that globalisation has changed the relative position of countries
in the global market quite radically and has increased the risk of a ‘specialisation trap’
in the global south. The findings in (Russi et al., 2008) show that increasing trade has
not decreased DMC. For instance, DMI in mining has increased in Chile and Peru, and
in crude oil and construction respectively, DMI has increased in Ecuador and Mexico.
The implications of these findings and their policy and political aspects are discussed at
more length in sections 4 and 5 respectively.
3.3 Tertiarisation cum de-materialisation? Myths and facts
Typical evidence of structural change is a shift from agriculture to industry and then
to services in a context of growing GDP (Fisher, 1939). The shift to services or ter-
tiarisation, is associated, intuitively, to some degree of de-materialisation, that is the
reduction of the material-intensity of products 11. However, we have relatively little
empirical evidence on the real de-materialisation effect of tertiarisation. The existing
evidence suggests a degree of scepticism. We review the findings in the recent context
of the call from policy makers for the re-industrialisation of economies 12 .
Is this at odds with enthusiasm for the potential of economic de-materialisation,
global emissions abatement and reduced materials intensity of production which are
supposed to result from a shift from manufacturing to services? Is there any empirical
10We devote a specific section to trade (4, here we consider the relative impact of trade liberalisation
on structural change for a set of LAC s.
11see ? for a recent examination of material and knowledge contents of industrial products.
12See advocates of a ‘knowledge driven re-industrialisation’ (European Union, 2013) as a strategy for
recovery from the recession that has affected EU country labour markets, in what it seems to be a
revisiting of the ‘Big-Push’ strategy in the old Europe. A ‘European Industrial Renaissance’ (European
Union, 2013) would require around a 50% increased demand for manufacturing goods (investment, final
consumption and export), accompanied by an associated expected growth of GDP and employment of
about 10% and an estimated increase in CO2 emissions of about 13%. The UK Industrial Strategy
launched in 2017 proposes a similar plan.
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support for the effect of tertiarisation on the de-materialisation of economies?
Kander (2005) provides one of the first descriptive empirical analyses of the asso-
ciation between tertiarisation and de-materialisation, focusing on the Swedish economy
from 1970. She argues that the decline in CO2 emissions in Sweden was linked mainly to
changes in the energy carriers mix that is, the fact that the electricity source was nuclear
hydropower and biofuels rather than fossil fuel, and more stable energy consumption.
She concludes that the effect of the changing sectoral composition of the Swedish econ-
omy has had a negligible effect on reducing CO2 emissions. (Kander, 2005) bases her
argument on a re-consideration of the Baumol’s cost disease argument put forward in
the 1960s by (Baumol, 1967) 13, which suggests that the increase in the services share
of economic activities is over-estimated when measured in real (i.e., based on constant
prices) rather than nominal terms.
In an updated version of their paper, Henriques and Kander (2010) reprise the ar-
gument based upon a more refined SDA. Using a LMDI applied to developed and de-
veloping countries, they find weak evidence of a EKC, especially in late industrialising
countries, in line with what the findings in Section 2. For the effect of sectoral change
on energy intensity, they measure structural change in sectoral composition in terms
of constant rather than current prices and employment. They estimate that the real
sectoral shift is of the order of 10% rather than the 30% measured at current prices.
This effect is much less substantial than usually found in empirical studies that examine
the same 50 year time span. The results of the LMDI decomposition show that sectoral
change had only a modest impact on lowering energy intensity and, especially, when
accounting for increased use of transport services. In contrast, Henriques and Kander
(2010) find that the within-sector effect – that is, the contribution of technical change
to lowering energy emissions – has a comparative larger impact.
More recently, It has been suggested that the analogue of Baumol’s cost disease –
reprised by Kander (2005) and Henriques and Kander (2010) to test the actual effect of
tertiarisation of economies on levels of emissions – is responsible for an ‘emissions dis-
ease’ effect for some European countries (Marin and Zoboli, 2014, 2016; ?). By looking
at direct and indirect effects of tertiarisation on the trend of CO2 emissions intensity
using WIOD data, (?) argue that the sources of Baumol’s cost disease - stagnant tech-
nological progress and slow productivity growth in most services - translate into similar
stagnant performance in terms of energy intensity. They test this conjecture by account-
ing for the initial levels of direct emissions intensity and the dynamics of direct emissions
across a few aggregate manufacturing and service sectors, and indirect emissions inten-
sity generated by domestic and imported final demand for the macro-sectors analysed.
Interestingly, they find that the direct emissions intensity of services is lower than the
13Baumol’s cost disease (Baumol, 1967) argues that, historically, services costs and wages have in-
creased despite a poor services productivity performance. They have been pushed up by manufacturing
sector wage increases in line with (higher) productivity gains. There is a major debate over the validity
of Baumol’s cost disease in relation to services, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. For the
purposes of the present review, it is important to acknowledge that the cost disease was attributed to
lack of technical progress in services and increased demand for services associated to higher income. For
further references, see (Ciarli et al., 2012; Gallouj and Savona, 2008).
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emissions intensity of manufacturing macro-sectors, with the exception of transport,
although European countries show high heterogeneity in emissions intensity over the pe-
riod considered. However, it has been argued that a slow improvement in environmental
efficiency in the stagnant services sector, combined with a rapid increase in their eco-
nomic share in real (constant prices) terms, have led to an overall slower improvement in
environmental efficiency. The authors describe this as the ‘emission disease of services
growth’. In addition, the evidence on indirect emissions intensity from domestic and
international final demand seems to suggest that the ‘environmental disease’ of services
shows increased dependence on emissions generated abroad (see Section 4 for a review
of this crucial topic).
Broadly in line with the results mentioned above, Mulder et al. (2014) (see also
Mulder and de Groot (2012) and Florax et al. (2011)) find that, while overall energy
intensity levels in several OECD countries during the period 1980-2005 has decreased,
this is due, partly, to sectoral change toward services and not improved energy efficiency
in these sectors.
Mulder et al. (2014) conducts an interesting exercise to forecast the effect of tertiari-
sation coupled (or not) with improved energy efficiency in services, in countries where
the transition to services is embryonic. They simulate three scenarios for a sample of
nine OECD countries: first, they observe that the trend in the aggregate energy intensity
levels would have shown significant increase had the share of value added in the service
sectors not grown since 1980, confirming that the sectoral effect plays a non-negligible
role in lowering overall energy intensity; second, they compare actual and hypothetical
energy intensity trends in the case of no improvement in energy efficiency in the ser-
vice sectors considered. They show that the hypothetical energy intensity saving for
the aggregate western economies would have been lower similar to the first scenario –
that is, the within-sector effect is comparatively smaller than the sectoral effect. Third,
they compare actual and hypothetical trends in energy efficiency improvements in the
service sectors and find that the overall hypothesised decrease in energy intensity is
more pronounced than the actual decrease. Overall, this confirms that the effect of a
shift to services on energy and emissions intensity decreases in the countries analysed is
lower that would have been achievable, had technical change allowed improvements to
the energy efficiency of services of a similar magnitude to the improvements that have
occurred in some manufacturing sectors.
There are two further potential explanations of these trends, beyond the problems
related to lack of technical progress, which hamper higher energy efficiency and lower
emissions intensity in services. One explanations is the increase in the carbon content
of trade and offshoring, and the increased number of sectors and sub-sectors exposed to
carbon leakage (Bolscher et al., 2013)14.
The second concerns directly to the role of demand and consumer preferences in re-
lation to basic goods, and luxury goods and services, and their respective environmental
14The relocation of manufacturing to less environmentally stringent countries, for instance, might be
a source of de-industrialisation, but not necessarily of lower (global) emissions since this phenomenon
hides carbon intensive offshoring. We tackle this briefly in Section 4.
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quality (i.e., levels of energy and emissions intensity). Consumer preferences and income
distribution are fundamental determinants of the shift to (less energy intensive and po-
tentially more environmentally friendly) services or products. Both the seminal (von
Hippel, 1988) and more recent (Garc´ıa-Quevedo et al., 2016) innovation literatures link
(incentives for) innovation efforts to the presence of a critical mass of demand. For in-
stance, (Garc´ıa-Quevedo et al., 2016), among other innovation scholars, show empirically
that incentives for firm investment in R&D reduce significantly if firms expect stagnancy
or lack of demand. More importantly, (von Hippel, 1988)’s contribution identifies the
pioneer consumer as promoting initial innovation investments and the introduction of
more energy efficient products or new services. This is based on pioneer consumers pref-
erences for higher (environmental) quality products and their ability to pay higher prices.
Once a critical diffusion is achieved, prices reduce and pull wider diffusion of new prod-
ucts and services among lower income consumers. However, it has been shown Magnani
(2000); Vona and Patriarca (2011) that the role of the pioneer consumer in the initial
diffusion of new, less energy intensive products and services (eco-innovations) has been
undermined by high income inequality and that preferences for environmentally friendly
products and services are highly non-linear. (Vona and Patriarca, 2011), in particular,
show that in a context of high income inequality, excessive income distance between the
pioneer consumer and low income consumers hampers the diffusion of new products and
services. The only aggregate effect - for instance, of the introduction of eco-innovation -
is a consumption polarisation, which does not lead to significant positive environmental
externalities15. These findings provide important insights for understanding the poten-
tial for technical change, higher energy efficiency and reduced emissions intensity linked
to a shift to services.
Overall, the empirical literature indicates that the decrease in energy intensity levels
linked to tertiarisation is less than the potential decrease, had services ensured within-
sector improvement in energy efficiency. However, the technological progress that would
make services less ‘stagnant’ (referring to Baumols cost disease (Baumol, 1967)) in-
evitably is linked to increased use of Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT ), which are heavy energy users. The findings show that services have experi-
enced a modest energy intensity reduction while their energy consumption share has
increased in absolute terms over time. An exception to this pattern is Japan, which
has seen an increase in both energy consumption share and energy intensity in services
(Mulder et al., 2014). Although the number of contributions that focus specifically on
the impact of tertiarisation on national and global emission and energy intensity trends
is appreciably smaller than the numbers of studies reviewed in the previous sections, the
de-materialisation of economies has been emphasised as contributing crucially to energy
efficiency improvements based on tertiarisation. This is slightly at odds with the fact
that the OECD countries seem to have reached a ceiling in relation to the real and nom-
inal shift to services. However, for developing and transition countries, the exploitation
of this sectoral shift remains a challenge and, perhaps, an opportunity and a potential
source of greater benefits in terms of reducing energy and emissions. This is feeding
15We reprise briefly in Section 3.4 examination of firm incentives to introduce eco-innovation.
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debate beyond environmental sustainability Rodrik (2016); McMillan et al. (2014); Di
Meglio et al. (2018) and represents a promising direction for research that would inform
green industrial policy (Rodrik, 2014).
3.4 Technical change, environmental regulation and firm eco-innovation
Technical change to increase energy efficiency and lower emissions intensity results to
a large extent from firm incentives and financial efforts to introduce eco-innovations.
These are supposed to reduce the environmental impact of production processes and/or
the introduction of new, cleaner products and services to achieve a critical level of
diffusion among consumers 16.
The seminal contribution on the relationship between the introduction of environ-
mental regulations and firm incentives to eco–innovate is the known Porter hypothesis
Porter and van der Linde (1995). In a nutshell, the Porter hypothesis is based on
the assumptions that incentives to spend on R&D and innovation are part of a profit
maximising strategy; that R&D spending is linearly and positively associated to the
introduction of product/service and process innovations, and that these increase sales
and profits or result from the need to comply to environmental regulations. The Porter
hypothesis supposes that well-designed environmental regulations can create incentives
for firms to innovate and increase competitiveness while achieving positive environmen-
tal externalities. Or, alternatively, that in the absence of such regulations, firms will be
neither able to identify or exploit technological and market opportunities to innovate
to reduce their environmental impact. In the context of the above literature, we need
to assess whether (within-sector) technical change is the result of an automatic market
mechanism based on perfect rationality, symmetric information and profit-maximising
behaviour or is the result of a carefully designed policy action based on the introduction
of environmental regulations, in the absence of which firms would not have any incentive
to reduce the environmental impacts of production processes.
The debate centred on the Porter hypothesis is grounded in the large literature
emerged since and a vast body of work over the last 20 or so years (for recent reviews
see (Wagner et al., 2004; Ambec et al., 2013)). Despite such remarkable research effort,
the empirical evidence does not reach a consensus on the Porter hypothesis, although,
on balance, it finds a positive relationship between environmental regulations and firms
(eco) innovation performance (measured as R&D expenditures or patent counts) (Jaffe
and Palmer, 1997; Ambec et al., 2013).17. What emerges from critiques of the Porter
hypothesis is that environmental regulation, ultimately, could harm economic growth
through the introduction of uncertain (in terms of their environmental impact) techno-
logical innovations. Supporters of the Porter hypothesis, point, instead, to the capacity of
public regulators to identify technological opportunities that would otherwise be missed
16We have briefly mentioned the role of the demand side and issues related to consumer preferences and
income distribution in the section on de-materialisation (3.3). We will reprise these from the international
perspective in Section 4. Here we focus on the (supply side) incentives that facilitate technical change
17Some empirical works that test the Porter hypothesis look at the effect of environmental regulation
in a PHH context (see Section 4)
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by a myopic, not fully informed and not optimising private sector. Popp et al. (2010)
offer a balanced review of the theoretical and empirical work on the induced innova-
tion from environmental regulation, highlighting, among other things, the barriers to
firm adoption of environmental regulations and the different effects on innovation and
productivity performance.
Nesta et al. (2014) and Nesta et al. (2018) offer recent and robust empirical evidence
on the effects of different types of environmental regulations - distinguishing between
market based (taxes, cap-and-trade systems, feed-in tariffs) and command-and-control
regulations which simply set emissions limits. They look at the effects of regulations on
both static and dynamic efficiency, where the latter measures the precise effect of the
regulations on firms incentives to eco-innovate, in countries at different stages of devel-
opment. Within the context of this review, (Nesta et al., 2018) offer original comparative
evidence of the effects of the introduction of different types of environmental regulations,
as well as policy mix of lowering entry barriers in conjunction with environmental regula-
tions, in countries at different stages of development. They find that in national contexts
with initial high levels of energy intensity and low levels of technological capabilities to
eco-innovate - such as emerging countries - stringent command-and-control regulatory
policies are more effective for creating incentives, whereas in (mostly developed) coun-
tries with initial low levels of energy intensity and long-term cumulated technological
capabilities, market-based environmental regulations might be more effective for creat-
ing incentives to achieve the technology frontier. Therefore, environmental policies have
large non-linear effects and the initial level of development and stock of technological
capabilities have a substantial role in directing technical change towards higher energy
efficiency and lower emissions intensity.
As argued also in Ambec et al. (2013), empirical tests of the Porter hypothesis might
push governments to design effective environmental regulations, for instance, in the US
where climate change denial has recently surged. Further work on the Porter hypothesis
would benefit from continuous research, more data collection, longitudinal analyses and
a better understanding of innovation in economic academic circles.
4 Global structural change, trade and the pollution haven
hypothesis
Trade, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), and increasing international fragmentation
of production leading to GVCs require consideration of the concept of structural change
and sustainable economic development from a global, cross-country perspective. Envi-
ronmental economists have investigated the effect of trade in relation to the PHH).
The PHH states that cross-country differences in environmental regulations could
lead developed countries to shifting the location of polluting industries to developing
countries and increasing imports of ‘dirty’ goods produced in developing countries. This
results in trade flows shaping specialisation patterns, such that developing countries
could achieve comparative advantage in the production of GHG intensive goods. Pro-
ponents of the PHH claim that this process contributes to explaining the inverted U
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shaped relation between growth and polluting emissions in developed countries (dis-
cussed in section 2), which can afford to clean their domestic production and to import
dirty products from developing countries. If the PHH could be confirmed empirically,
this would substantially weaken arguments in support of a national EKC : although an
individual country might manage to achieve a certain level of decoupling, this would
not necessarily translate into a global emissions reduction since different countries hold
different positions in the global effort towards mitigating climate change. One of the
consequences of the PHH is that a global EKC trend would be unlikely; more likely
would be a redistribution of emissions across countries.
The PHH has a numerous contributions, some in support, others offering counter-
arguments (including among others, (Cole, 2004; Panayotou et al., 2000; Kander and
Lindmark, 2006; Wiedmann, 2009)). For instance, according to (Cole, 2004), first, dif-
ferent international environmental regulations are not enough to increase environmental
compliance costs, which could be large in absolute terms, but as a percentage of the
firm’s total costs, might be negligible. Second, these cost differences are not sufficient to
determine the re-location of firms to developing countries. Third, the relocation of firms
would be deterred by other aspects such as poor infrastructure, corruption, institutional
instability and potential reputation losses if Multinational Corporations (MNC ) are per-
ceived by the media and the public as contributing to ‘trading jobs for emissions’ (Arto
et al., 2014).
PHH scepticism revolves around how the different flows of net exports are interpreted.
Specifically, an increase in dirty net exports from developing countries might be due to
an increase in their overall consumption shares (and, therefore, production) of dirty
products. Similarly, a decrease in net dirty exports in developed countries might be
due to a smaller domestic share of dirty consumption rather than this demand being
met by imports from developing countries. This latter argument is among several that
explain national EKCs. That is, GDP and income growth are associated to changes in
consumption preferences, which become more price inelastic and move towards cleaner,
although more expensive products 18.
Several scholars have tried to test the PHH. For instance, (Cole, 2004) estimate
a EKC equation that takes account of different types of polluting emissions, income,
sectoral change and trade, for developed and developing countries. In the context of
emissions trends (specific to air and water pollution), their findings support an inverted
U shaped relation to income, with a turning point of about $43K in 1973. Sectoral
changes are partly responsible for the decline in emissions since the manufacturing share
of GDP is correlated positively to the environmental quality of most of the indicators
considered in their work. In the context of trade, the PHH is partly proven for some
pollutants and some periods of time. This supports the view that the occurrence of a re-
distribution of emissions in line with the PHH being responsible, in part, for the national
EKC and, therefore, that a global ‘EKC effect’ does not hold. The turning points are
at lower levels of income than if the PHH effect is held constant. Cole and colleagues
18We link the main caveat to this evidence, to the presence of non-homothetic preferences (Magnani,
2000; Vona and Patriarca, 2011)
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find that air pollution emissions, in particular, seem to have a negative relationship
to the share of pollution-intensive imports from developing countries. More recently,
Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) empirically assessed the post-Kyoto protocol effects in
terms of emissions trading and found that the binding commitments under Kyoto have
increased committed countries’ embodied carbon imports from non-committed countries,
by around 8% and increased the emissions intensity of their imports by about 3%.
(Cherniwchan et al., 2017) provides a recent review of the methods, findings and
policy implications for trade and the environment, which points to the importance of
micro-level analyses for empirical assessment of the PHH. The authors combine reviews
of traditional decomposition analyses with a partial equilibrium model of firms (and
plants) strategic decisions. Production strategies at the micro level and their impact
on emissions complete the picture of the impact of trade on emissions at the global
level. From our perspective, and in line with (Cherniwchan et al., 2017), the pollution
offshoring hypothesis is particularly interesting. Although similar to the PHH, according
to (Cherniwchan et al., 2017) [p. 4] it ‘explicitly links firm level decisions to offshore dirty
intermediate inputs to trade liberalization’. The decision to off-shore dirty segments
of production to less strictly regulated countries competes with abatement decisions.
Trade liberalisation and environmental regulation might reduce the incentive to invest
in emissions abatement technologies since these would be more costly than offshoring
dirtier production. Investigating firms (heterogeneous) off-shoring decisions should be
part of the PHH empirical research agenda.
Overall, the evidence related to the PHH is uncertain in terms of whether develop-
ing countries will experience similar EKC patterns. If the income elasticity of ‘dirty’
manufacturing products remains the same, then domestic sectoral change in developed
countries towards less polluting sectors will be merely hiding a pollution haven effect.19
The PHH debate is particularly relevant to the developmental and employment po-
tential of economic growth. A multifaceted notion of sustainable development, which
includes economic and social aspects as well as environmental sustainability, would need
to account for countries’ different preferences related to full employment and/or greener
growth. Some scholars, for instance (Arto et al., 2014)), argue that when considering
the occurrence of a PHH and suggesting a feasible global climate change policy, it is
important to ‘discount’ the detrimental effects of the environmental burden displaced
on the global south by the developed countries against the net employment gains that
accrue to the developing countries via increased exports. In other words, some countries
are ‘trading emissions for jobs’.
To investigate this empirically, Arto et al. (2014) examine emissions and employment
in the world economy, under the assumption that some developing countries might agree
to bearing the environmental costs of more energy intensive exports in exchange for net
employment gains. They use multi-regional I/O data on emissions and employment trade
balances. They define a country A as in ‘emissions surplus’ if the emissions generated
19Those interested in the broad topic of trade and emissions, and trade liberalisation and the PHH
could refer to (Taylor, 2005) and (Barba Navaretti et al., 2014) for extensive theoretical and empirical
reviews.
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by that countrys exports are greater than the emissions generated by its trade partner
country B to produce the goods imported by country A. Similarly, they define a country
as in an employment trade balance surplus if the employment generated by its export
activity is greater than the employment loss due to importing. Based on these definitions,
they find that countries that are in net emission surplus are those that gain the most in
terms of employment generation.
Their findings show that the key players in the ‘trading emissions for jobs’ game are
China, the US and the EU27.20 In this context, it should be noted that the debate on
the PHH is being affected by a radically changed perspective on emissions responsibility:
the producer responsibility principle has shifted to a consumer responsibility principle,
which is supposed to correct for the potentially perverse effect of an emissions trade (see
also (Peters, 2008) and (Wiedmann et al., 2011)) for some relevant policy implications
of the emissions responsibilities generated by international trade.)
In the context of this review, policy makers need to be aware of the trade-off be-
tween emissions reductions and job creation, which is sector specific, as highlighted in
Section 3. For example, energy, gas and water supplies are the most emissions-intensive
and the least employment-friendly sectors compared to electrical and optical equipment
manufacturing where an emissions-reduction policy that limited exports would result in
comparatively higher job losses (see Figures 5 and 6).
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
[FIGURE 6 HERE]
Another contributor to the debate on the PHH, from the perspective of natural
resources extraction and use, is (Wiedmann et al., 2013) (see also (Wiedmann, 2009)
and (Wiedmann et al., 2011) for prior methodological contributions). (Wiedmann et al.,
2013) identify national Material Footprints (MFs), using a consumption-based indicator
of resources use, which is equivalent to raw materials use, for the international trade
of 186 countries over the period 1990-2011. 21 Their empirical exercise shows that,
at higher levels of income, countries tend to reduce their domestic materials extraction
through international trade, but overall materials consumption increases.
More in-depth empirical analyses of the trade-offs from environmental sustainability
in terms of sectoral level employment gains (see Figure 7), would provide a clearer
indication of the sectoral change that would reduce environmental impacts and increase
employment.
[FIGURE 7 HERE]
20Although China is a top emissions exporter, with an estimated 37.5% of employment creation through
international trade, and the US and the EU27 are its main export destinations, it is the EU27 that
emerges as the top importer of embodied emissions.
21The authors use the global MRIO (Multi-Region I/O) database, EORA, and the Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) Global Material Flow Database.
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5 The political economy debate around the pollution haven
hypothesis
The political economy debate over international trade and displacement of the environ-
mental burden from developed to developing countries hosts different perspectives. The
potential emergence of persistent ecological distributional conflicts is considered differ-
ently by environmental economists, ecological economists (Muradian and Mart´ınez-Alier,
2001; Muradian et al., 2002; Pe´rez-Rinco´n, 2006; Russi et al., 2008; Munoz et al., 2011)
and political ecologists (Mart´ınez-Alier, 1995; Mart´ınez-Alier et al., 2010). These strands
of work are of interest here, as national structural change policies need to take account
of employment friendly shifts that minimise emissions and energy intensity increases,
in a global context that is experiencing increased inequality in the distribution of the
environmental burden generated by trade specialisation.
Muradian and Mart´ınez-Alier (2001) and Muradian et al. (2002) review some of
these perspectives. Generally, environmental economists see trade barriers as illegitimate
policy tools even in the context of international differences in environmental standards,
which are the origins of the PHH evidence. Any outcome that is based on free trade
is supposed to be better from an environmental perspective since, in the long run, the
high rate of growth ensured by free trade will shift consumers environmental preferences
towards cleaner products and ensure better environmental outcomes (see, for instance,
(Werner Antweiler and Taylor, 2001)). Also, although some countries have less strict
standards in line with their particular environmental and/or growth priorities, these are
not tenable in the long run. For example, MNCs will avoid investments in developing
countries with weak environmental regulation, because poor quality institutions and
infrastructure will make them less attractive.
Ecological economists tend to be critical of the benefits of free trade (see, e.g.: (Pe´rez-
Rinco´n, 2006; Russi et al., 2008; Munoz et al., 2011)). They reject the assumptions
made by environmental economists that free trade leads naturally to higher growth
rates. They argue that economic growth is a limited indicator of welfare since it ignores
environmental externalities and the depletion of natural capital. Further, it cannot be
taken for granted that higher growth rates will ensure a long run (how long?) shift in
consumers environmental preferences towards greener products and reduce environmen-
tal exploitation, especially in contexts of high between-country inequality (Vona and
Patriarca, 2011). The idea of ensuring growth and being able, later, to account for en-
vironmental damage is unsustainable in the long run. First, the long run consequences
of environmental degradation are largely unknown and the negative effects of loss of
biodiversity are virtually infinite and, therefore, not discountable. Second, the EKC
predicts generally higher GDP turning points than the world median GDP per capita.
An inverted U shaped relation between income and environmental conditions could lead
to irreversibility of the ecological threshold before the economic threshold is achieved.
Ecological economists highlight that the most likely scenario, based on international
differences in environmental regulations, is a permanent divide between the developed
and the developing countries, with cost-internalising systems resulting in a systematic
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race to the bottom. The World Trade Organization (WTO) should prevent ecological
dumping and encourage standardisation of environmental regulation so that demand for
green products from the north will lead, eventually, to changed production processes in
the south.
(Muradian and Mart´ınez-Alier, 2001) calls for a synthesis of the ecological economists
and political ecologists views, and a ‘Southern approach’ to resolve eco-dumping. It has
in fact been suggested that the perspective of ecological economists, summarised above, is
representative of a ‘northern perspective’. In our view, a ‘northern ecological perspective’
is likely to minimise the real environmental displacement to the south in a context where
the south is being encouraged to be more sustainable in relation to its natural resources
use and specialisation in primary products. Encouraging increased exports of natural
resources and primary products from the south, to preserve the local environment in the
north, is likely to widen the north-south gap and become a ‘specialisation trap’ for the
south. Ultimately, policies supporting export and specialisation in primary and natural
resources sectors in general, might produce short-run improved growth rates in the south,
but more pervasive asymmetries and unsustainable development in the long-run.
It is argued (see also (Pe´rez-Rinco´n, 2006; Russi et al., 2008; Munoz et al., 2011))
that a finer-grained policy perspective should take account of the different national
centres of power to formulate an institutional approach to environmental issues, aimed at
correcting the intrinsic asymmetries that are exacerbated by MNC world trade related
to primary products and extractive activities. For instance, the idea that developing
countries could benefit from upgrading their specialisation to the immediate upstream
phases of raw materials use, is misleading. It would exacerbate the environmental cost
to the south of both extraction and processing of raw materials. It is predicted that
the world will witness an increasing unequal ecological exchange, with a new wave of
‘environmental Prebisch deterioration’ in the terms of trade.
Environmental Terms of Trade (ETT ) and the Balance of Embodied Emissions in
Trade (BEET ) are used to test the hypothesis of an ‘environmental Prebisch deteriora-
tion’ in the terms of trade 22. Contributions along these lines are intended to represent
a counter-argument to the evidence provided by the World Bank, based on what Mu-
radian et al. (2002) call ‘weak sustainability indicators’, which measure the monetary
value of the natural capital depletion associated to imports of natural resources. Strong
sustainability indicators include both the monetary value of natural capital depletion
and trace countries ecological footprints, including, among other things, environmental
space, material flows, the pollution embodied in trade-flows, assessed in physical units
of measurement (see also (Wiedmann et al., 2013)).
In the absence of a decisive political choice, persistent unequal ecological exchanges
will imply increasing peripheralisation of environmental intensive activities to the south,
leading to a specialisation trap (see also Mart´ınez-Alier (1995) and Mart´ınez-Alier et
22ETT and BEET allow quantification of the ecological exchange and occurrence of a Prebisch de-
terioration in the environmental terms of trade: a country A causes a deterioration in the ETT of a
country B if the environmental burden of A’s import from B is systematically larger than the burden of
B’s imports from A. A falling ETT s mean that A is displacing its consumption environmental burden
to B, which is reflected in their respective BEET s.
23
al. (2010)). This, in turn, will erase the idea of a national EKC and a decoupling
between economic growth and environmental degradation in which embodied pollution
is systematically higher than the reduction inGHG emissions achieved locally over time.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1 Summary of the empirical evidence
We reviewed the empirical evidence on selected aspects of structural change and en-
vironmental sustainability, within three broad areas of investigation, which cut across
the contributions from a variety of disciplines including environmental and ecological
economics, development, economics of innovation, trade. The three areas are: (i) the
origins and development of the EKC, since its original formulation to the latest empirical
analysis conducted in developed and developing countries; (ii) the relationship between
changes to the sectoral composition of economies, technical change and their impact
on the emissions and energy intensity of production, with a particular emphasis on the
processes of tertiarisation; (iii) the effect of the globalisation of structural change and
changes to trade patterns on the global map of emissions intensity, with a particular
emphasis on the PHH and north-south equity linked to global trade.
We summarise below the (relatively) uncontroversial evidence that emerges, while in
the next section we highlight areas that would require further research efforts.
(i) On the EKC : Since the mid 1970s, an overall decoupling between growth and
energy intensity has occurred. However, this global average hides a large degree of
cross-country heterogeneity: only a few countries have experienced a real decoupling
between growth and energy intensity. In most cases, the global decreasing trend in
energy intensity is attributable to a share of countries growing proportionally faster,
rather than to an actual decrease of the level of energy inputs into GDP.
The energy/capital ratio has been declining over time proportionally more than en-
ergy intensity. Conversely, those countries that have experienced an increase in their
energy intensity levels have seen their energy/capital ratios increasing, for instance,
African and Latin American countries.
The cost share of energy in GDP has decreased over time, suggesting an increase in
effective energy per effective worker over time (with income), which has driven down the
energy cost share .
Finally the energy quality mix has improved with income growth. For instance,
evidence for the LAC s shows remarkable differences across countries, depending on their
natural resources specialisation and forestry land area: the majority of LACs show an
N-shaped EKC curve, which drives the trend for the whole region and does not support
the occurrence of a global EKC (see also point iii) below).
(ii) On whether structural change in general and particularly that consisting of shifts
towards services implies de-materialisation of economies and reduced energy intensity.
Focusing on the OECD countries, the literature shows that, overall energy intensity lev-
els since the mid 1980s, have decreased mainly due to within-sector technical change
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that have led to improved energy efficiency and reduced emissions trends. The between-
sectors effect has also brought about improvements in energy intensity trends, due,
partly, to sectoral change toward services. However, current energy intensity improve-
ments seem to be substantially lower than if services had achieved greater energy effi-
ciency improvements via technical change. There is unexploited potential for energy in-
tensity reductions, which is dependent on catching up in services to ensure within-sector
energy efficiency improvements. The technological progress needed is however linked to
increased use of ICTs, which are energy-intensive and could offset the (material-intensity)
gains of a structural shift to services. An important related issue is the extent to which
demand is able to support a shift to services that ensures a degree of de-materialisation.
This is linked to the role of consumption preferences and, importantly, within and across
country income inequality.
(iii) On the presence of a PHH : The displacement of the environmental burden
linked to north-south trade, and large differences in environmental regulations, support
the PHH and the view that a global level ‘EKC effect’ has not occurred. There is
some uncertainty about whether developing countries will experience the same EKC
patterns that have characterised the developed countries. If the income elasticity of
manufacturing ‘dirty’ products does not fall, this will lead to domestic sectoral change
in the developed countries toward less polluting sectors which will entail a PHH effect.
For instance, LACs are net exporters of material-intensive goods as well as being the
potential destination for relocated ‘dirty products’.
(iv) On the link between trade and environmental equity. Policy makers in the global
south should be warned about a ‘northern ecological perspective’ that aims to minimise
environmental displacement from north to south. The long-run consequences of system-
atic ‘trading jobs for emissions’ in the south is likely to produce a larger north south gap
and a ‘specialisation trap’ for the south. Further, the hypothesis of an ‘environmental
Prebisch deterioration’ in the terms of trade should be seen as a possible alternative to
the World Bank trade scenario. This is based on weak rather than strong sustainability
indicators, which discount the long-run natural capital depletion that a specialisation
trap might lead to.
6.2 A research agenda on structural changes and environmental sus-
tainability
The empirical evidence reviewed in this work is not always conclusive about the effects
of structural changes on environmental sustainability, due, not least, to the intrinsic
uncertainty linked to future technical change aimed at reducing energy intensity across
different sectors. However, the areas selected here and the related findings provide useful
background to inform debates on the political economy of environmental policies.
Some of the topics do not offer conclusive evidence, and this opens gaps in the
literature that would need to be addressed through further research effort.
The most important, in our view, is the ’ trading jobs for emissions game, which
characterises the strategies of many developing countries. In this respect, this empirical
review puts into perspective many of the positions that have emerged post-Kyoto and
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post-Paris protocols (Aichele and Felbermayr, 2015), and encourages more fine-grained
empirical analyses of the resulting changing shape of trade. In parallel, more refined
data, especially EEA data, should be a priority world-wide.
All the aspects of structural changes covered in this review represent areas of policy
intervention. These are:
• sectoral upgrading, ideally towards sectors that are less energy and emission in-
tensive, but with high employment elasticity;
• technological upgrading in sectors that present higher technological opportunities
to improve their energy mix, among which firm incentives to eco-innovation as a
result of appropriate environmental regulations;
• continuous effort to maintain and increase the stock of technological capabilities
to lower energy and emission intensity of production;
• bold interventions to reduce within- and between-country inequality, which emerges
to be the condition sine qua non for policies that create incentives to move to green
consumption to be effective.
Particularly in developing countries, there is a policy conundrum linked to the ‘trad-
ing jobs for emissions’, and, more generally, to improve the environmental sustainability
of their growth patterns. To appropriately inform the policy choices illustrated above,
more research is needed.
A first fruitful line of research should aim at examining whether and to what extent
tertiarisation implies degrees of de-materialisation and reduced energy and emissions
intensity. A few studies, beyond those reviewed in this paper, have attempted to under-
stand the degree of achievable reductions in energy, emissions and material intensity in
the presence of (eco) innovation in services (Desmarchelier et al., 2013; Desmarchelier
and Gallouj, 2012). Particularly in this domain, it would be important to grounding
concerted actions in the domains of industrial and environmental policies, most espe-
cially in developing countries. Indeed, in a context of premature de-industrialisation in
emerging economies (Rodrik, 2016; Di Meglio et al., 2018) it is important to identify
suitable directions of structural change.
A second research endeavour worth pursuing is to achieve a higher degree of multi-
disciplinariety in tackling societal challenges linked to the environment, particularly to
address those related to the ‘trade jobs for emissions’ game illustrated above. Environ-
mental economists, political ecologists and environmental ecologists should join forces
and offer an integrated view of how to tackle the opportunities and challenges that devel-
oping (and developed) countries face. One such challenges is to determine the benefits,
side-effects and conditions for developing countries to participate to global value chains.
In a context of increasing international fragmentation of production, eco-dumping might
be more likely to occur, and the enforcement of global environmental standards such as
those proposed by the latest Paris Agreements become even more crucial.
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Thirdly, our review highlighted the need to devote more research effort to the effects
of environmental regulations on demand, particularly accounting for consumer prefer-
ences and income inequality. This view is supported in a recent contribution that has the
ambition of setting a new research agenda for the emerging field of ”Envirodevonomics”
to tackle climate change (Greenstone and Jack, 2015). According to (Greenstone and
Jack, 2015), Envirodevonomics should devise a new political economy framework to
address environmental sustainability in developing countries, one that shapes the rela-
tionship between economic development, changing patterns of consumption and allows a
global governance of environmental quality. Indeed, one of the nodal issues at the inter-
section of these areas is the need to increase the Marginal Willingness To Pay (MWTP)
for higher environmental quality in developing countries: a low income level is identified
as the main impediment for individuals to value improvements in environmental qual-
ity higher than a marginal increase in income, not surprisingly. Addressing within and
between countries income inequality is a must for both international development and
global environmental sustainability, and our auspice is that more empirical efforts helps
grounding actions in this domain.
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7.1 List of Acronyms
• BEET: Balance of Embodied Emissions in Trade
• CAAA: Clean Air Act Amendment
• DMC: Domestic Material Consumption
• DME: Domestic Material Extraction
• DMI: Direct Material Input
• EEA: European Environmental Agency
• EKC: Environmental Kuznet Curve
• ER: Environmental Regulations
• ETT: Environmetal Terms of Trade
• FDI: Foreign Direct Investments
• GHG: Greenhouse Gas (emissions)
• GDP: Gross Domestic Product
• GVC: Global Value Chains
• ICT: Information and Communication Technology
• IDA: Index Decomposition Analysis
• LACs: Latin American Countries
• LMDI: Log-Mean Divisia Index
• MFA: Material Flow Analysis
• MNC: Multinational Corporations
• MRCI: Mean Rate of Change Index
• NRI: Natural Resource Industries
• OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
• PHH: Pollution Haven Hypothesis
• PTB: Physical Trade Balance
• R&D: Research and Development
• SDA: Structural Decomposition Analysis
• SEA: Socio Economic Account (in WIOD)
• SEEA: System of Environmental-Economic Accounting
• WIOD: World Input Output Data
• WTO: World Trade Organisation
37
7.2 Non-exhaustive list of data sources
IEA data: http://www.iea.org/statistics/
EEA data: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps
Penn World Tables: http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/
International Comparison Programme: http://icp.worldbank.org/
Maddison Project Data: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm
Total Economy Database: http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/
University of Queensland International Comparison Database:
http://uqicd.economics.uq.edu.au/
Centre for International Price Research: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/cipr/index.html
OECD Environmental Data Compendium: http://www.oecd.org/env/indicators-modelling-
outlooks/oecdenvironmentaldatacompendium.htm
OECD Environmental Data and Indicators: http://www.oecd.org/env/indicators-modelling-
outlooks/data-and-indicators.htm
Database of Social, Economic and Environmental Indicators for
Latin America and the Caribbean: http://www.cepal.org/cgi-
bin/getProd.asp?xml=/prensa/noticias/comunicados/5/26665/P26665.xml&xsl=/prensa/tpl-
i/p6f.xsl&base=/prensa/tpl-i/top-bottom.xsl
UN Environment Programme, Division of Early Warning and Assessment:
http://www.unep.org/dewa/africa/




Figure 1: Correlation between Growth rate of gross output and energy use (a);
Correlation between initial levels and growth rates of energy intensity (b).
Source: Voigt et al. (2014)
Figure 2: Index Decomposition Analysis for countries with low initial en-
ergy intensity and very low energy intensity reduction (less than 1% annually).
Source: Voigt et al. (2014)
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Figure 3: Comparative energy intensity decompostion in LACs. Source: Jimenez
and Mercado (2014)
Figure 4: Comparative energy intensity decomposition in LACs. Source:
Jimenez and Mercado (2014)
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Figure 5: Global GHG emissions embodied in exports by sector in selected
countries. 2008 Note: See Appendix. Source: Arto et al. (2014)
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Figure 6: Global employment embodied in exports by sector in selected coun-
tries, 2008.(Million jobs). Note: See Appendix. Source: Arto et al. (2014)
Figure 7: Trading jobs for emissions. Source: Own elaboration based on Altomonte
and Correa (2011)
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